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One of the themes in the discussion about Galileo's 
work is the debate about the extent to which he is an 
empiricist, or whether he is seen primarily as a 
rationalist. More specifically we can focus on deter-
mining what sort of an empiricist he is, how he uses 
mathematics, and how this reflects his philosophy of 
nature. Without attempting to definitively charac-
terize him as either rationalist or empiricist, this 
paper considers the manner in which Galileo's con-
clusions rest on what may be identified as rational or 
empirical grounds. As will be shown, the strains of 
his empiricism are various and relative to the types of 
phenomenon investigated by him. Further, to the modern 
reader, a consideration of his work also presents the 
epistemologically interesting problem of recognizing 
theoretical foundational achievements in their 
genetical stages, after living in an age when the 
puzzles he tackled now have adequate theoretical 
description, or are no longer physically inaccessible 
as they were to him (such as the earth's motion). Our 
present investigation, therefore, is guided by an in-
terest in the epistemological 'fault' which Galileo's 
work represents. Because his concerns were with 
Nature, the present inquiry is directed not only to the 
character of knowing, but to the character of 
mathematical and natural necessity as well*. 
To examine these questions it is helpful to start 
in the context of the observations Stillman Drake 
provides about Galileo's self-image in Section XXVI of 
his introduction to "The Assayer"[l]. There he refers 
to Galileo's odd insistance of having the title 
'philosopher' in addition to 'court mathematician' and 
remarks that 
He agreed (with Telesio] that in order to become 
science, philosophy must throw out blind respect 
for authority, but he also saw that neither 
observation, nor reasoning, nor the use of 
mathematics could be thrown out along with this. 
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True philosophy had to be built upon the inter-
play of all three, and no combination could sup-
ply the absence of any one of them.[2] 
Further, that "his entire attitude has been well summed 
up by the saying that he was never willing to accept 
any intermediary between himself and nature."[3] 
"The difference between philosophizing and study-
ing philosophy," wrote Galileo in his notes on 
Lagalla's book, "is that which exists between 
drawing from nature and copying pictures. In or-
der to become accustomed to handling the pen or 
crayon in good style, it is right to begin by 
redrawing good pictures created by excellent 
artists. Likewise in order to stimulate the mind 
and guide it toward good philosophy, it is useful 
to observe the things that have already been in-
vestigated by others in their philosophizing; 
especially those which are true and certain, 
these being chiefly mathematical . . . . But 
men who go on forever copying pictures and never 
get around to drawing from nature can never 
become perfect artists, or even good judges of 
painting. For they remain unpracticed in 
separating the good from the bad, or the ac-
curately from the poorly drawn, by means of 
recognizing in nature itself (as a result of 
countless experiences) the true effects of 
foreshortening, of backgrounds, of lights and 
shadows, of reflections, and of the infinite 
variations in differing viewpoints . . . . In 
the same way a man will never become a 
philosopher by worrying forever about the 
writings of other men, without ever raising his 
own eyes to nature's works in the attempt to 
recognize there the truths already known and to 
investigate some of the infinite number that 
remain to be discovered. This, I say, will never 
make a man a philosopher, but only a student of 
other philosophers and an expert in their 
works."[4] 
Notwithstanding the obvious mediation we must apply 
as readers and discussants of his work, these passages 
help us assume a similar posture towards Galileo, that 
is, one without intermediaries. To get a sense of what 
he described and how he did it, it helps to brush aside 
all our conceptions of modern physical theory, ex-
perimental techniques, and technology through which our 
understanding of the physical universe is as much bog-
gled and dissipated as it is mediated and extended. 
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What we should picture is a man well-versed in the 
mathematics up to his day, especially the works of 
Archimedes and Euclid, who was equipped primarily with 
a powerful intellect, and who set out to describe, 
among other things, the motion in the heavens and of 
the objects found at hand around him. 
Before we turn to a direct examination of some 
features of his work in the Dialogue on the Great World 
Systems and Two New Sciences, I'd like to discuss 
what's at issue in the discussion of his 'empiricism' 
or his 'rationalism* or even 'platonism*. Strictly 
speaking, of course, questions about the structure of 
knowledge itself, its origination from experience or 
thought, and what sort of certainty it has were not the 
main topics of his investigations. Clearly, the 
polemic of the Dialogue centers on the motion of the 
earth and its position in the universe. In Two New 
Sciences is presented the consideration of cohesion in 
solid bodies and their motion on the earth. It is we, 
looking back on his work, who try to determine how 
questions of this nature can be answered and on what 
its status as knowledge depends. The question we ask 
ourselves is: what is involved in being able to say 
from our vantage point of walking on its surface that 
the earth moves? or what sort of description can we 
make of the motion of a body falling to the ground? 
The extent to which these descriptions rest on what can 
be observed or on how we make sense of it correlates 
with the extent of our empiricism or rationalism. 
Within this context we begin to see that the em-
piricism of Galileo's conclusion that the earth moves, 
for example, is necessarily oblique. Lacking any sort 
of rocket technology, there is simply no point to which 
he could remove himself to make an observation, nor any 
direct way such a statement could be verified or 
experienced. What collectible information there is 
from the earth's surface has to be 'reasoned' to its 
status as evidence for its motion. For example, even 
the use of a telescope and its power to bring distant 
objects closer depends on the understanding that this 
enables us to better discern features which indeed 
belong to the object and are not due to some optical 
trick. Then, further, a reasoned framework has to be 
supplied, within which the properties of these distant 
bodies might be seen to have something to do with the 
problem at hand. The type of experiment and empirical 
evidence that can be employed in the determination of 
the earth's motion depends irreducibly on placement 
within some larger framework which has other bases 
(observable and/or theoretical) for its determination 
than the motion of the earth, on analogy of its motion 
to other observable motions, either in the sky or on 
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the earth, or on hypotheses which are able to link ob-
servable phenomena with the earth's motion. This is a 
different sort of empiricism than that which bore out 
Mendel's hypothesis about the genetics of sweet peas, 
for example, where he was able to breed a control group 
and then simply observe if what he expected took place 
or not. When we fully appreciate the special difficul-
ties of the determination of the earth's motion, albeit 
we see it fully within the realm of physical phenomena, 
we are not so unsympathetic to Cardinal Bellarmine 's 
judgement of the evidence as ultimately no more than 
support for a working hypothesis. At the same time, we 
can see the extent to which Galileo's method was neces-
sarily philosophical and how far our capability presen-
tly to so remove ourselves from the earth's surface as 
to be able to watch it move rests on essentially 
speculative maneuvers. 
Apart from the strictly epistemological 
consideration, we can distinguish generally the use of 
experiment and evidence from the senses to which, of 
course, Galileo makes appeal numerous times. In so far 
as he is describing Nature, this realm necessarily 
provides what is to be taken up. As in his treatment 
of naturally accelerated motion, this is the actual 
motion of heavy bodies close to the earth's surface. A 
determination of which experiments among the many he 
describes were actually performed or not, we leave to 
the historians of science. Sometimes we are clearly 
asked to hypothesize a given situation. Other times, 
as in the measure of the speed of a ball rolling down a 
grooved plank with a water clock, they are presented 
precisely to illustrate how his theorizing truly 
describes what happens. The empiricism of this case is 
not so much a determination of the validity of 
Galileo's analysis; the theory already has a validity 
from its being derived mathematically. Here it is used 
to insure the correspondence of the two—mathematical 
description and the occurrence in nature. 
The main point of this discussion has been to set 
off the strictly epistemological question which per-
tains to the structure of knowing itself, from the 
different senses of 'empiricism' and its relativity to 
what it is summoned to establish and to what is esta-
blishable empirically. We have seen generally that 
with respect to the determination of the earth's 
motion, substantiation rests irreducibly on theoretical 
grounds. For the description of naturally accelerated 
motion, on the other hand, the progress of a ball down 
an incline or the free fall of an object to the earth 
is entirely observable. This is not to deny a dimen-
sion of the analysis which is essentially theoretical, 
too, but simply to distinguish its type of empiricism. 
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We will now first take up some of the arguments in the 
Dialogue on the Great World Systems and then turn to 
the analysis on Local Motion in the Two New Sciences to 
more clearly demonstrate this difference. 
The first issue which is addressed in the Dialogue 
is the Aristotelean separation of realms—celestial and 
earthly. The immobility of the earth rested in part on 
its opposition to the divine. The earth is susceptible 
to generation, corruptibility, and alteration. The 
motion natural to it is upwards and downwards. The 
heavens are eternal, changeless, and perfect. Circular 
motion is complete and self-contained and appropriate 
to the perfection of the celestial bodies. The earth's 
position at the center of the universe derives from the 
Aristotelean analysis of the three motions—motion is 
either up, away from the center; down, towards the 
center; or motion around the center. The motion of 
bodies on the earth being up and down, it follows that 
the earth is a center point. 
Galileo refutes this position first by separating 
the consideration of corruptibility, generation etc. 
from that of a body's motion, saying that the former 
has nothing to do with the latter and secondly that 
these so-called terrestial characteristics can in fact 
also be found in the heavens. He points to the obser-
vance of sunspots to show that the sun sustains 
changes. From the property of spherical bodies of 
being more luminous when the surface is rough and can 
scatter the light than when they are perfectly smooth, 
he shows the moon's surface to have mountains and 
valleys, i.e., imperfections, and so to resemble the 
earth. The empirical evidence here is used with 
respect to the placement of the earth's motion within a 
theoretical framework, except negatively. In other 
words, because the earth's immobility derives from its 
place within the Aristotelean world picture, Galileo's 
first tack is to find flaws in the framework. Being 
able to show that the earth could have a place in the 
heavens along with the other celestial bodies weakens 
considerably the integrity of Aristotle's cosmology, 
and makes logical 'room' for the construction of 
another framework within which its motion would be 
possible. 
Argument from observed motions as analogous to 
earth's is used both to refute its mobility 
(Aristotle's use) and to bolster the Copernican system 
(Galileo's use). In the first case Aristotle maintains 
as follows: 
All movables that move circularly seem to stay 
behind and move with more than one motion, except 
the first sphere (i.e., the Primum Mobile). 
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Therefore the Earth moving about its own centre, 
being placed in the middle, ought of necessity to 
be carried about in two ways and also to stay 
behind. But, if this were so, it would follow 
that there should be a variation in the rising 
and setting of the fixed stars, as we do not per-
ceive this to be done; therefore, the Earth does 
not move, etc.[5] 
Aside from the retrograde motion, which of course would 
only be a consequence of observing the earth from the 
point of view of another planet, the double motion of 
the earth is precisely what Galileo would like to show. 
That such a motion might imply a variation of rising 
and setting of the stars which is lacking is an impor-
tant consideration which he deals with at length later. 
Here he undercuts Aristotle's conclusion by showing its 
necessity is tied to the simple plurality of the 
motions. To show that it is stationary, he would also 
have to establish the impossibility of it moving with 
only one motion. 
Galileo himself argues on analogy from his obser-
vation of a sphere floating in a bowl of water. In 
"The Assayer" he describes the spontaneous motion about 
its vertical axis that the sphere acquires relative to 
the bowl when the bowl is moved in a circle at arm's 
length. This was used to lend plausibility to the 
motion of the earth contrary to all other celestial 
motions that the Copernican system introduced, and for 
which it was criticized as entailing something 
unlikely. Its utility is, of course, dependent on as-
sumptions about the fluidity of the medium in which the 
earth is suspended, and in fact isn't helpful in the 
determination of the actual period of revolution about 
earth's axis. This only illustrates further the incon-
clusiveness of any particular empirical evidence in 
isolation from a framework which can connect the 
phenomenon with the earth's motion. 
The third use of empirical evidence is that which 
is linked to the earth's motion by hypothesis. Such 
arguments as the straight fall of an object dropped 
from a tower, the lack of high winds, the stability of 
the objects on its surface, the lack of parallax of the 
fixed stars, the seasonal variations, and the tidal 
theory all fall generally in this class. Within this 
loose association we quickly find differences in their 
respective utility and purpose. However, they still 
have this in common, that all these observations having 
anything to do with the earth's motion clearly rest 
with their analysis. In regards to the possibility of 
making experiments which "demonstrate" such phenomena, 
Salviati sarcastically recommends to Simplicius that he 
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'have the experience' and sugaests the fol 'experiment'|6I: 
. . . For a final proof of the nullity of all the 
experiments before alleged, I conceive it now a 
convenient time and place to demonstrate a way 
how to make an exact trial of them all. Shut 
yourself up with some friend in the largest room 
below decks of some large ship and there procure 
gnats, flies, and such other small winged 
creatures. Also get a great tub full of water 
and within it put certain fishes; let also a cer-
tain bottle be hung up which, drop by drop, lets 
forth its water into another narrow-necked bottle 
placed underneath. Then, the ship lying still, 
observe how those small winged animals fly with 
like velocity towards all parts of the room; how 
the fishes swim indifferently towards all sides; 
and how the distilling drops all fall into the 
bottle placed underneath. And casting anything 
towards your friend, you need not throw it with 
more force one way than another, provided the 
distances be equal; and jumping broad, you will 
reach as far one way as another. Having observed 
all these particulars, though no man doubts that, 
so long as the vessel stands still, they ought to 
take place in this manner, make the ship move 
with what velocity you please, so long as the 
motion is uniform and not fluctuating this way 
and that. You shall not be able to discern the 
least alteration in all the forenamed effects, 
nor can you gather by any of them whether the 
ship moves or stands still . . . .[7] 
Now that we are clearly in the realm of theoretical 
analysis we can begin to sketch out some of Galileo's 
method in this respect. The first task is to sort out 
the connection of the description of falling bodies to 
the motion of the earth. Insofar as the problem is 
formulated in Aristotelean terms, the main issue is the 
description of the path. Simplicius holds that on the 
evidence of the senses, one can see plainly with the 
eye that when the stone falls, it falls along the side 
of the tower perpendicularly, no deviating from side to 
side, and it lands at the base of the tower. If the 
earth moved, the tower would have displaced that amount 
from where it stood at the time of the release of the 
stone, leaving it behind. Analytically he is confined 
to seeing this as evidence of the earth's immobility. 
The three motions—up, down, and around the center— 
were exhaustive of those naturally occurring; and the 
stability of the center point relative to these motions 
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is necessarily manifest. The completeness and finitude 
of the universe, however, rest on the understanding 
that this is the only center point for the motions in 
the heavens, that this center belongs accidentally to 
the earth, but absolutely to the universe. The first 
step out of this position is to conceive of multiple 
center points with circular motion about those occur-
ring naturally. The move consists in being able to ab-
stract from what is observationally available, in order 
to construct something which is conceptually available 
and indeed capable of telling us 'more' about any given 
phenomenon than what we can experience about it. That 
abstraction of this sort was possible and still ap-
plicable to naturally occurring phenomena was of course 
what was unacceptable to Aristotle in his separation of 
mathematics and physics. The mathematization of nature 
rests on the capability of constructions of the 
imagination to sometimes correspond with events which 
happen totally outside of it.[8] A kind of commen-
surability between the necessity involved in 
mathematical progressions and proof structures and the 
necessity to be found in a regularly occurring event 
must be grasped, or at least imagined possible. For 
Aristotle, the possibility of such a correlation was 
inconceivable. Hintikka and Rentes[9] see this diff-
erence as a reflection of the choice of methodological 
paradigm. For Archimedes and Galileo, the structures 
of geometrical analysis were exemplary of what was to 
be discovered in phenomena. For Aristotle, things of 
motion, change, and animation followed more closely the 
model of human deliberation. At any rate, it is ab-
straction of the former sort that allows Galileo to 
make connections between the behavior of observable 
moving bodies and the hypothesized motion of the earth, 
which was unobservable. 
The verifiability of such relationships, that is, 
relationships that are mathematical in the sense that 
through conception they provide a basis for further 
description which is inaccessible to merely empirically 
grounded observation (the epistemological correlate to 
this is the subject/object oppositional paradigm for 
knowing or any theory of consciousness which is based 
on the model of perception such as Husserlian 
phenomenology), is a separate issue, and any given 
analysis is subject to evaluation and critique along 
whatever lines possible. The description of a circular 
path for the ball which falls along the side of the 
tower, for example, wouldn't today be considered a 
'correct' physical description of the falling body. 
Certainly Galileo himself did not think it definitive. 
As Santillana points out, he at times uses mathematical 
analyses that we know he knew were not the best 
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descriptions of the phenomena in question. And others, 
such as his theory of the tides, were highly controver-
sial and uncertain. It is indicative of his method 
throughout the Dialogue that these analyses were used 
essentially polemically—essentially to show that the 
earth's motion at least was not impossible. 
We are now in a position to examine his use of 
mathematical analysis in the case of an observable 
movable. To do this I would like to focus on his 
treatment of naturally accelerated motion in Two New 
Sciences.[10] We must immediately recognize that the 
arguments and conclusions capable of being made are 
different in the following respect: that on the stren-
gth of his arguments alone, the strongest case that 
Galileo can make for the earth's motion is that it is 
not impossible that it does move. In contrast, the 
laws that he discovered concerning naturally ac-
celerated motion can be considered to be positively as-
serted albeit with the degree of certitude that 
geometry can display. They are, however, ultimately 
similar in respect to the non-observability of the 
conclusions. Although we can watch the ball roll down 
the inclined plane, or fall from our hands to the 
ground, that the final degree of speed is twice that 
had it been carried over the same distance at constant 
velocity (Proposition I, Theorem I) or the proportion 
by which it accelerates as it does so (Proposition II, 
Theorem II, Corollary I), are neither of them ascer-
tainable by simply watching what happens. In the case 
of the earth's motion, we were incapable of removing 
ourselves to a point of observation, giving rise to our 
dependency on what reason can tell us. In the latter, 
although the phenomenon itself is accessible, its 
measure is not, without the aid of the geometrical 
conceptual framework. By this we must necessarily at-
tribute primacy to the role of reason in our ability to 
set up experiments which may confirm or refute our 
theoretical explorations and hunches. This at first 
sight neat separation, however, does not belie the 
somewhat miraculous correspondance that such reasoning 
seems to have with what actually naturally occurs. 
This connection is what sets Galileo's work off as a 
science of motion from an artifically conceived 
mathematical verity. 
The entire set-up of the treatment of naturally 
accelerated motion is based on the definition of 
uniformly accelerated motion as that "which, abandoning 
rest, adds on to itself equal momenta of swiftness in 
equal times"[11] and the acceptance of his postulate 
that "the degrees of speed acquired by the same movea-
ble over different inclinations of planes are equal 
whenever the heights of those planes are equal."[121 
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Although this cannot be proved, he provides us with the 
experiment of the ball swinging from a string around a 
nail to help persuade us that the impetus gained in 
descent is what determines the ball's subsequent ascent 
as it swings up past the nail which interrupts its arc. 
The rest of the propositions and theorems are con-
structed given a moveable which is uniformly 
accelerating. This is exemplary of the ultimately 
hypothetical character of any science. That a ball 
falling was uniformly accelerated was an idea that was 
accepted generally, although not really capable of 
being proven. All of the demonstrations depend on this 
as given, and once the science is worked out, its cor-
respondence to actual occurrence is so compelling (as 
analogous to the observations Stillman Drake makes 
concerning Galileo's use of actual experiments in his 
work on projectile motion) we have no reason to reject 
it. The propositions and theorems establish certain 
properties of the motion, by way of working through 
different casses— 1) straight along inclined planes 
and 2) circular motion—and the problems in the science 
are to make sure different geometrical constructions 
can be made according to what those properties would 
imply. His famous law on the eternality of unimpeded 
horizontal motion at constant velocity is not 
demonstrated, and is to be understood, and rightly so 
as he has placed it in a scholium[13] after the 
proposition (XXIII) which brings it to mind, apart from 
the rigorous structure of the rest of the science.[14J 
It is, however, strictly reasoned from the ex-
trapolation of what would occur upon the removal of 
both downward acceleration and upward retardation. As 
he states it 
whatever degree of speed is found in the 
movable, this is by its nature [suapte natura] 
indelibly impressed on it when external causes of 
acceleration or retardation are removed, which 
occurs only on the horizontal plane; for on de-
clining planes there is cause of more [maiorisj 
acceleration, and on rising planes, of 
retardation. From this it likewise follows that 
motion in the horizontal is also eternal, since 
if it is indeed equable it is not even weakened 
or remitted, much less removed.[151 
What this paper has tried to do is reveal the 
epistemological structure of the arguments and method 
that Galileo used first in the Dialogue on the Great 
World Systems and secondly in Two New Sciences. Their 
similarities consist in their ultimate dependence on 
conceptualization, which emphasizes the strong 
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•rationalism' to be found in Galileo. They are diff-
erent in their use of both mathematical analysis and 
experiment. Because of the nature of the problem in 
the Dialogue, both different descriptions of motion of 
things on the earth and different empirical obser-
vations and experiments could only be used indirectly 
to support or refute the probability of the earth's 
motion. The conclusions of the Two New Sciences, in 
contrast, rest directly on the geometrical analysis of 
the phenomenon and experiments in this case are used to 
insure a natural correspondence. 
141 
NOTES 
1Stillman Drake, translation Discoversies and Opinions of Galileo (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957). 
2Ibid., p. 224. 
3Ibid., p. 224. 
4Ibid., p. 224-25. 
5Galilei Galileo, Dialogue on the Great World 
Systems, translated by T. Salusbury, edited by Giorgio 
de Santillana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1955), p. 63. 
^Another way of viewing the 'experiment' is to see 
it as the newtonian principle of relativity, that is, 
that it is possible to measure the acceleration of a 
coordinate system but not its velocity, in anecdotal 
form. 
7 . 
Dialogue on the Great World Systems, p. 84. 
Q 
If mathematics is understood primarily as a 
science of the imagination, the epistemological problem 
is how it can have applicability to something beyond 
the imagination. 
Q J. Hintakka and U. Remes, The Methods of Analysis (Massachusetts: D. Reidel, 1974). 
1 0Galilei Galileo, Two New Sciences, translated by Stillman Drake (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974). 
UIbid., p. 154. 
1 2Ibid., p. 162. 
1 3Ibid., p. 197. 
14 
This law which has the status of well-argued com-mentary in Galileo's treatise is equivalent to Newton's first principle. 
142 
Two New Sciences, p. 197. 15 
